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Information on Ukrainian air strikes on Belgorod raises a number of questions in expert circles regarding the configuration of the deployment of various types of air defense missile divisions within the air force and military air defense on the ground in the Belgorod region. The troubleshooting of the investigation functions for radar detectors connected to the air defense missile group deployed near Belgorod is also the subject of analysis.

In particular, to have information from colleagues on the experience of combat use of long-range anti-aircraft missile systems S-300PM2, S-300V4, S-400 against the Ukrainian “Points-U” within the framework of SVO, and because they knew the coefficient of effective reflective surface of these missiles (in the order of 0, 15-0.2 sqm), the combat crews in the above complexes were aware of the capability of 30 / 92N6E lighting and control radars and 9S19M / -4 program review radars to identify and capture such objects at a distance of 100 to 150 km. Therefore, if, for example, two S-400s or S-300V4s were deployed near Belgorod (the villages of Mayskoye and Maslova Pristan), their divisions could intercept the Ukrainian Tochki-U literally 8-10 seconds after launching from the northern districts of Kharkiv. the region.

Given the short reaction time of the S-400 and S-300V4 fire control systems (9 and 7.5 respectively), as well as the higher cruising speed of the 48N6DM and 9M82MV anti-aircraft missiles compared to the Tochki-U (2,600 to 1,036 m / c), it is not difficult to conclude that the interception of the attacking Tochek-Us on a collision course would take place literally 10 seconds after the latter entered Russian space (about 20 km from Belgorod). And even the debris that passed to the descending branch of the runway and the warheads of the intercepted 9M79-1 missiles that were not initiated would hardly reach the sparsely populated suburbs of Belgorod.

In addition, the presence of 6 target channels for the 92N6 and 9S32M4 lighting and control radars made it possible for single S-400 and S-300V4 anti-aircraft missile batteries to intercept only three Tochka-U ballistic missiles fired by Ukrainian formations. two anti-aircraft missiles from 150-pound warheads for each “Point”. We have seen a completely absurd picture, when the interception of the approaching Ukrainian “Points-U” did not begin across the Russian-Ukrainian border, but directly across the regional center, where their downward branches of the tracks already completely ruled out the displacement of the sector of fragments from urban development to nearby neighborhoods.

The most active part in repelling the attack with 9M79-1 missiles was taken by Pantsir-S1 / M anti-aircraft missile and pistol systems with two-stage 57E6 missiles, whose light 20-kilo warheads are not always sufficient to initiate cluster “equipment” “Points- U “in the air. And this is not to mention the fact that the 57E6E SAM radio command control system does not involve the implementation of the kinetic destruction of an enemy missile and its warhead by the direct hit-to-kill method.

A rather logical question arises: why did several multi-channel divisions of “three hundred”, “four hundred” and possibly even “Bukov-M3” fail to destroy Ukrainian ballistic missiles at a safe distance from Belgorod?

First of all, we can talk about the deployment of S-400 and S-300V4 divisions, not in the south, but in the northern surroundings of the regional center. And this means that the meeting between SAM-interceptors and “Point-U” took place already in the immediate vicinity of the city, when the latter switched to a dive mode on the urban development in Belgorod. In the case of the deployment of these divisions on the far southern approaches to the city (near the villages of Oktyabrsky and Maslova Pristan) for the early defeat of the Ukrainian “Points-U” on the runway, the first firing positions would be within the radius of action of CEASAR, PzH-2000 self-propelled guns deployed north of Kharkov and M109A3GN, capable of disabling 30 / 92N6E and 9S32M4 lighting and control radars in the S-400 and S-300 complexes.

The solution to this problem can only mean that the mechanized and artillery units of the Ukrainian army are pushed from the villages of Prudyanka and Borshcheva, which border Russia, to the outskirts of Kharkov. In this case, the “four hundred” and “three hundred” deployed south of Belgorod will be out of range of the Ukrainian cannon artillery and will be able to effectively intercept both “Point-U” and 227 mm guided missiles M31A1 GMLRS and even longer range ER -GMLRS without the threat of a massive attack of smaller and more difficult to capture 155 mm artillery shells. Currently, the offensive operation of the Russian army’s regular units to Kharkov from the north is entering the active phase, and therefore the solution to the above problems is not far off.

An equally serious reason for such a critical approach to Belgorod of the Ukrainian “Points-U” may be the temporary shutdown of radiation (the position of the circular view of the airspace) by the operators of early warning radar 1L119 “Nebo-SVU”, “Opponent- G “or one of the 96L6E height detectors, assigned S-400 divisions and S-300V4 batteries. This could have happened due to the need to diagnose or repair the element base on the radars, including the rotary drives for active or passive headlights, as well as microwave encyclopedias. After all, no one has yet removed the coefficient of operational reliability.

The operators of the 96L6E Altitude Detectors who remained in combat service could select the low altitude detection mode as a priority. After all, in recent days, Ukraine’s armed forces have repeatedly resorted to unsuccessful attempts to overcome the anti-missile “umbrella” from the Russian air forces in the Kursk direction using low-altitude strikes and reconnaissance UAVs Tu-141 Strizh and Tu-143 Reis. As a result, the sector view mode with an altitude scanning zone of -3 and 60 degrees could not be used at all temporarily, while it is in this zone that the marching sections of the trajectories of Tochka-U tactical ballistic missiles are located. As a result, Ukrainian missiles could only be detected on the last sections of the orbits using the RLM SOC radar detectors in the Pantsir-S1 complex at a distance of about 17 km, which was the reason for their untimely interception over the city.

Radar detection of all heights 96L6. Illustration: militaryrussia.ru

To avoid such situations, all anti-aircraft missile divisions, S-400, S-300PM2, Buk-M2 / 3, as well as the Pantsir-S1 and Torov-M2U batteries, must be integrated into a single network-centered mixed anti-aircraft missile unit together with a number of interchangeable monitoring radar “Nebo-SVU”, 96L6, “Podlyot-K1”, which will enable the air defense missile defense team to compensate for the temporary cessation of operation of one or more radars by continuing to monitor the missile hazardous direction with remaining active radars.

And of course, every air force and military air defense missile brigade that covers strategically important border facilities and regional centers in Russia must have at least one S-350 Vityaz air defense missile regiment or a Buk-M3 battery equipped with supermaneuverable SAM interceptors 9M96DM and 9M317MA. These anti-aircraft missiles are equipped with centimeter-centric J-band active radar detectors of the Slanets type, as well as gas-dynamic “belts” of transverse steering motors and gas jet propulsion vector deflection systems.

These functions of control and command systems make it possible to destroy the enemy’s maneuverable ballistic objects by kinetically destroying combat units, of which the S-300PM2 and S-400 are not always capable.

Evgeny Damantsev

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